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MANDAMUS IN ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS:
CURRENT APPROACHES
In 1972, the ministerial-discretionary distinction, described as
the "mischievous dichotomy"1 and widely criticized,2 remained the
major problem area under the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962.'
Recent cases involving mandamus with respect to administrative
action reveal that courts are split in their approaches as to when
mandamus may lie. Many courts follow the traditional ministerial-
discretionary distinction and indicate that mandamus is proper only
if there is a ministerial duty imposed by law. Other courts, departing
from the rigid ministerial-discretionary distinction, indicate that
mandamus will lie even in a case involving a discretionary duty when
the permissible scope of discretion has been exceeded. 4
Mandamus is a judicial command requiring the performance of
a specified duty which has not been performed.' Originally a common
law writ, mandamus has been used by American courts to review
administrative action.6 Over forty years ago the Supreme Court
gave a classic explanation of the use of mandamus:
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use. It is also employed
to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and
discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion
in a particular way, nor to direct the retraction or reversal of action
already taken in the exercise of either.7
Although in 1937 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure technically
abolished the writ of mandamus,8 it is clear that similar relief, an
1. Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962
and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 308, 316 (1967).
2. See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e) (1970).
4. See note 42 infra.
5. JAFFE 176.
6. W. GELLo1RN & C. BYSE, Amris'TR&rrvE LAw, CASEs AND COMMENTs
119-20 (5th ed. 1970). Originally, mandamus was a writ issued by judges of the
King's Bench in England. American courts, as inheritors of the judicial power
of the King's Bench, adopted the use of the writ. Id.
7. Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218 (1930). See also
Jacoby, The Effect of Recent Changes in the Law of "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review,
53 GEO. IJ. 19, 25-26 (1964).
8. Scire Facias and Mandamus. The writs of scire facias and mandamus
are abolished. Relief heretofore available by mandamus or scire facias
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action in the nature of mandamus, is still available; 9 Rule 81 (b)
specifically provides that the relief previously available under the
writ of mandamus may still be obtained. 10 Apparently, the mandamus
relief presently available is granted or withheld under the same princi-
ples that governed the former common-law writ.11 Under this
traditional approach, mandamus will lie only if the duty of the
officer is ministerial-a duty positively commanded, plainly defined,
and peremptory.12  If the duty is determined to be discretionary-
allowing some exercise of judgment-mandamus is improper.18
Prior to 1962, except for the District Court for the District
of Columbia,14 federal courts had no jurisdiction to issue original
writs of mandumus.' As a result, parties throughout the country
seeking mandamus relief, including relief in response to federal
administrative action, were forced to bring suit in the District of
Columbia. In 1962 Congress enacted section 1361 of the Judicial
Code, The Mandamus and Venue Act, which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in
the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the
may be obtained by appropriate action or by appropriate motion under the
practice prescribed in these rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(b).
9. E.g., Finley v. Chandler, 377 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
869 (1967); Hammond v. Hull, 131 F.2d 23, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318
U.S. 777 (1943).
10 See note 8 supra.
11. 3A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDURE § 1692
at 169 (Wright ed. 1958). See generally H. HART & H. WECHSLER, Tim FEDERAL
COURTS AM TIM FEDERAL SYSTEM 1377-85 (2d ed. 1973).
12. See, e.g., Thomas v. Vinson, 153 F.2d 636, 638-39 (D.C. Cir. 1946);
United States ex rel. Roughton v. Ickes, 101 F.2d 248, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
13. See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
14. In Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 522 (1838),
the Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, then a
court of original and appellate jurisdiction, had jurisdiction to issue original writs
of mandamus. The Court stated in support that the Act of February 27, 1801, ch.
15, § 1, 2 Stat. 103, provided that the laws of Maryland were to continue in force
in that part of the District of Columbia given by Maryland to the United States,
id. at 619-20, and that the laws of Maryland authorized writs of mandamus to
compel an executive officer to perform a ministerial act. Id. at 621. See generally
Byse & Fio~ca, supra note 1, at 310-12. For the historical development of the
federal court system, see H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THu FEDERAL COURTS AND THu
FEDERAL SYSTEm 32-49 (2d ed. 1973); Surrency, A History of the Federal Courts,
28 Mo. L. REv. 214 (1968).
15. An 1813 Supreme Court case, M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504
held that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not grant jurisdiction to lower federal
courts to issue original writs of mandamus. 3 DAvis § 2310, at 336.
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Section 1361 gives each federal district court subject matter juris-
diction of any action in the nature of mandamus and the express
power to compel a government official or agency to perform an
affirmative duty. The purpose of section 1361 was not to expand
judicial review of federal administrative action,", but merely to make
mandamus relief available in federal district courts throughout the
country, thus alleviating the inconvenience of bringing an action
only in the District of Columbia.19 However, by extending the
power to issue original writs of mandamus throughout the federal
court system, the Mandamus and Venue Act forced all district courts
to contend with the traditional difficulties of mandamus.
Courts have adopted two approaches in construing the duty
element required for mandamus under section 1361. Under the
first approach, the court makes the traditional determination of
whether the alleged duty is ministerial or discretionary. If the duty
is determined to be ministerial in nature, mandamus will issue.
However, if the administrative action sought to be compelled is
found to be discretionary, the court will find itself lacking in juris-
diction under section 1361. This first approach seems to have been
approved by many courts which have dealt with the problem in
recent years.20 In some of these decisions, courts have specifically
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). For insight into mandamus in state courts,
see Norvell & Sutton, The Original Writ of Mandamus in the Supreme Court of
Texas, 1 ST. MARY's LJ. 177 (1969); Comment, Noteworthy Developments in
California's Administrative Mandamus, 8 CALUF. WEsT. L. RaV. 301 (1972).
17. When the bill was being considered, the Justice Department proposed a
draft which was different in an essential respect. Instead of the words "duty owed
to the plaintiff," 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970), the Justice Department bill contained
the words "a ministerial duty owed to the plaintiff under a law of the United
States." S. RE. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1962). The Justice Depart-
ment's proposed bill would have, in effect, directly and positively incorporated the
traditional ministerial-discretionary distinction into section 1361. The sponsors
feared that the proposed insertion of the word "ministerial" would resurrect the
ministerial-discretionary distinction, Byse & Fiocca, supra note 1, at 316; and the
bill passed into law without the insertion. Id. at 317-18; see 108 CoNG. Rac.
20079 (1962). For a discussion of the legislative history of section 1361, see Byse
& Fiocca, supra note 1, at 313-18; Jacoby, supra note 7, at 20-23.
18. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 1, at 319. See Jacoby, supra note 7, at 21-22.
19. See id. at 19.
20. Within the last three years, a significant number of courts have denied
mandamus under section 1361 in opinions which indicated that mandamus could be
employed only to compel an administrator to perform a duty that is ministerial in
nature. Keeny v. Secretary of the Army, 437 F.2d 1151 (8th Cir. 1971) (former
serviceman brought action to compel correction of his military record); Yahr v.
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indicated that the ministerial duty requirement precludes judicial
review under section 1361 even if an administrator abuses his dis-
cretion. 1
Under the second approach adopted by courts when construing
the duty element for mandamus, the court first determines whether
the duty alleged to be owed is ministerial or discretionary. If the
duty is found to be ministerial in nature, mandamus will lie as in the
first approach. However, even if the duty is found to be discretionary,
the court will further determine whether, by failing to perform the
duty, the administrator exceeded the permissible scope of his discre-
Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (servicemen brought action for injunc-
tion forbidding prohibition of right to hold meetings on military reservation and
right to distribute materials in opposition to Viet Nam war); Still v. Commanding
Officer, U.S. Army Reserve Center, 334 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ala. 1971), vacated
on other grounds, 463 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1972) (reservist brought action to chal-
lenge denial of his application for discharge from Army as a conscientious ob-
jector); Schmidt v. Laird, 328 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (serviceman
brought action for discharge from Army as a conscientious objector); Bass Angler
Sportsman Soe'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412, 416 (N.D. Ala.),
aff'd sub nom. Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 447 F.2d 1304
(5th Cir. 1971) (fishing association brought action to require Secretary of Army
and Chief of Corps of Engineers to establish and apply standards for issuance of
permits allowing deposit of refuse into navigable waters). Cf. McQueary v. Laird,
449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971) (resident of Rocky Mountain Arsenal area brought
class action to enjoin storage of chemical and biological warfare agents). See also
Iowa City-Montezuma R.R. Shippers Ass'n v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1383,
1387 (S.D. Iowa 1972) (plaintiff sought jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)
(1970), and not under section 1361).
Some cases state that mandamus will not lie if the action sought to be com-
pelled is discretionary in nature. Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.C. 1972);
Schmidt v. Laird, 328 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D.N.C. 1971); Langston v. Ciccone, 313
F. Supp. 56, 60 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (federal convict sought release from custody
of director of United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, alleging lack
of due process in the revocation of his parole).
21. Jarrett v. Resor, 426 F.2d 213, 216-17 (9th Cir. 1970); accord, Gonzales
Salcedo v. Lauer, 430 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970); Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964
(E.D.N.C. 1972).
The Jarrett court stated:
The complaint in this action does not allege that defendants have failed to
fulfill a plainly described ministerial duty. It alleges at most that in fulfill-
ing their duty of acting upon his request for a discharge from the Army,
they either abused their discretion, incorrectly found the facts, or mis-
applied the law. It follows that neither on its face nor in substance, can
the complaint be regarded as invoking jurisdiction under section 1361.
426 F.2d at 216-17 (emphasis added).
For authority indicating that an abuse of discretion may be remedied by mandamus
see W. GELLHORN & C. Bysn, ADMnnSmrA= LAW, CAsns AND Comrssn 120
(5th ed. 1970); JAFFE 182. Arguably courts utilizing the second approach (see
notes 22-23 infra and accompanying text) are making a determination of whether
or not there has been an abuse of dis.cretion. See note 38 infra.
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tion.22 The court will typically examine the statute granting the
authority to the administrator, the congressional purpose, and other
data such as the pertinent administrative regulations, in order to
delineate the boundaries within which the officer may permissibly
exercise his discretion; if those bounds are exceeded, mandamus will
lie.2 3
A 1972 district court case clearly demonstrates that a court
utilizing the first approach will consider itself to be without subject
matter jurisdiction if no ministerial duty is shown, even though an
abuse of discretion is indicated. In Yahr v. Resor,24 plaintiff soldiers
brought an action for mandamus against the Secretary of the Army
and the Commanding General of Fort Bragg, alleging that they were
being deprived of certain First Amendment rights25 under allegedly
unconstitutional military regulations. 26 After noting that the military
regulations had previously been declared constitutional,27 the District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina held that it was
without subject matter jurisdiction under section 1361. The court
stated that before mandamus may issue it must be clear that the duty
of the federal officer "be ministerial, plainly defined, and peremp-
tory. ' 28 The court then stated that although an abuse of discretion
is a legally cognizable wrong, a writ of "[miandamus is not a proper
remedy to challenge abuse of discretion. '29  Thus, in Yahr, the court
was unwilling to examine the action of the federal officer even to
determine whether he had acted arbitrarily and abused his discretion;
the court found itself without jurisdiction under section 1361 be-
cause the actions complained of were committed in the exercise of
a discretionary function and were not "merely ministerial involving
a clear and peremptory duty to plaintiffs. 30  Under the first ap-
22. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
23. The commentators have shown near unanimity in advocating an examina-
tion of the scope of discretion employed in the second approach. Byse & Fiocca,
supra note 1, at 333-34; 3 DAvis § 23.11, at 360-61 (advocating the use of equitable
principles to determine scope of review); JAFFE 181-83. Likewise, the commenta-
tors uniformly criticize the ministerial-discretionary distinction employed in the
first approach. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 1, at 333-34; 3 DAvis § 23.12, at 361;
JAFFE 181.
24. 339 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
25. Plaintiffs alleged that they were denied the right to hold public meetings
and distribute anti-war materials on the military reservation. Id. at 966.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 967.
28. Id.
29. Id. See note 21 supra.
30. 339 F. Supp. at 967.
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proach, as set out by the Yahr case, even if an administrator were
clearly to act in a manner inconsistent with the powers granted to
his discretion, mandamus would not lie.
The second approach was employed in 1972 by the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Lovallo v. Froehlke.31 Lovallo, a soldier,
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to compel the Army to dis-
charge him as a conscientious objector.32  When the District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted the writ, the Army
placed Lovailo on leave status38 and appealed the adverse decision.
The Second Circuit subsequently reversed and dismissed the peti-
tion.34 For several months after the appellate decision, the Army
failed to order Lovallo back to active duty;35 however, such an order
was issued one day after Lovallo's original term of enlistment had
expired .3  The Army contended that the leave period was ex-
cludable from and would not count toward fulfillment of plaintiff's
obligated term of duty. The plaintiff thereupon brought an action
for mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Army to order his
discharge. The court indicated that the question in the case was
whether the three month delay in the issuance of the Army orders
was an abuse of discretion so gross as to justify issuance of a writ of
mandamus to release him;37 the court held that it was not.3 8  Unlike
the court in Yahr, the court did not merely utilize the traditional
ministerial-discretionary approach; rather, it made a determination
of the permissible scope of discretion.3 9 In so doing, the Lovallo court
31. 468 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1972).
32. Id. at 341.
33. See id. at 341-42. Contrary to the order of the appellate court that he was
to "remain on leave status," id, the Army subsequently ordered Lovallo "released
from the custody and control of the Army" without granting him a discharge; there-
fore, Lovallo "found himself out of the Army, 'released from military control,' though
without being released from active military duty or discharged to reserve status,"
Id. at 343.
34. Lovallo v. Resor, 443 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1971).
35. Lovallo was on leave status for more than six months after the habeas
corpus order was reversed. 468 F.2d at 346.
36. Id. at 343.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 346. The court stated that the Army's inaction was sensible during
the ninety days following the court's reversal of the habeas order, the period during
which Lovallo could have petitioned for certiorari. Id.
39. Id. at 345-46. The court cited United States ex rel. S.chonbrun v. Com-
manding Officer, 403 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 929 (1969),
for the proposition that the court would not "undertake 'civilian review of discre-
tionary action by the military' in so-called 'hardship cases.'" 468 F.2d at 344.
However, the court noted that Schonbrun was distinguishable. Since the court
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looked to the relevant circumstances 40 in determining that the issuance
of Army orders was an act within the permissible bounds of dis-
cretion.41  This second approach typifies the reasoning utilized in
recent Second Circuit cases,42 as well as in several cases decided out-
might "properly examine whether the Army has followed its own regulations" it
could certainly determine the effect of the court's own mandate, the dismissal of the
habeas corpus appeal. Id.
40. In determining that the discretion granted to the Secretary of the Army
had not been abused, the court looked to the plaintiff's oath of enlistment, a statute
defining active duty, and the effect of the delay on the plaintiff. Id. at 345-46.
41. In addition, the Court recommended the formulation of an army regula-
tion prescribing the procedure for recall of a soldier who was granted a writ of
habeas corpus which was later reversed on appeal. Id. at 346.
42. A series of recent decisions in the Second Circuit has indicated, at least in
dicta, adherence to the second approach. In Casarino v. United States, 431 F.2d
775 (2d Cir. 1970), the court of appeals indicated that the standard of "rational
exercise" would be utilized to ascertain whether or not a discretionary action was
beyond the reach of mandamus under section 1361. The court held that an Air
Force decision to call the plaintiff physician to active duty as a general medical
officer was within the province of a "rational exercise of discretion," and declined
to grant relief. Id. at 777.
In Nixon v. Secretary of Navy, 422 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1970), a Navy enlisted
man brought an action for mandamus to cancel an enlistment extension agreement,
alleging that he had received none of the benefits for which the extension was
executed. Denying relief, the court held that the ruling of the Chief of Naval
Personnel in denying the cancellation was not so arbitrary as to justify judicial
intervention. The court, however, expressed the caveat that official military
conduct may "go so far beyond the limits of what may be considered a rational
exercise of discretion as to call for mandamus." Id. at 939. In its determination of
whether or not mandamus would lie, the court viewed rationality as the standard
against which to measure the exercise of discretion. See also Feliciano v. Laird,
426 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1970); Stone v. Jennings, 318 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
In Leonhard v. Mitchell, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1973), a divorced husband brought
an action for mandamus to compel a Justice Department attorney, who had arranged
secret relocation and new identities for the husband's former wife and children after
the wife's new husband testified against members of an organized crime syndicate,
to disclose to the former husband the new location and identities of his children.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that while traditionally mandamus was
appropriate to compel officials to comply with the law only when no discretion was
involved in that compliance, decisions construing section 1361 have also held
that official conduct can go so far beyond any rational exercise of discretion as
to call for mandamus. Therefore, the court must determine the scope of discretion
when considering a request for relief under section 1361. The court, however,
denied relief because section 1361 requires a duty owed by a government official.
The husband had relied only upon the due process clause of the fifth amendment
to establish the duty, claiming that the clause protects the liberty of parents to raise
their children as they see fit, free from federal interference. The court stated that
this contention went too far, id. at -, and that having found no violation of
statutory or constitutional rights, id. at -, a federal ourt is without jurisdiction
to issue a mandamus order. Id. at -.
In Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y.
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1971), a district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss an action for the
return of copies of plaintiff's checks and back records seized by the FBI. In denying
the existence of jurisdiction under a section 1361 mandamus theory, the court stated
that "[n]ormally, acts of discretion are not subject to mandamus, although officials
may occasionally go so far beyond their discretion as to warrant judicial inter-
ference." Id. at 242 (emphasis added). The court thus evidenced a willingness to
look beyond the determination of whether an administrative action was ministerial or
discretionary and to examine the scope of discretion to determine if the act sought to
be compelled was outside that scope. The court nevertheless revealed a simultaneous
recognition of the traditional theory, stating that mandamus under section 1361 was
appropriate "only to review ministerial acts. . . ." Id.
In Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), mandamus was
ordered by a district court to cancel the transfer orders of members of the U.S. Army
Band who alleged they were transferred as a result of their antiwar activity. The
court stated that discipline which was otherwise lawful becomes illegal when utilized
to suppress first amendment (free speech) rights. In response to the defense that
no mandamus jurisdiction existed because the actions complained of were discre-
tionary, the court answered:
It is equally well established that mandamus may be used to correct abuse
of discretion by a federal officer, particularly if the abuse constitutes a
violation of constitutional rights.
The instant action has at its heart allegations that military officers
acted so as to violate [plaintiff's] constitutional rights . . . . If these
allegations have merit, the military officers acted outside the scope of their
discretionary authority. Id. at 812 (citations omitted).
The district court indicated that an examination of the scope of discretion of the
Secretary of the Army was proper, that this examination revealed that the limits of
his discretion had been exceeded, and that mandamus was proper to reverse his
action, albeit discretionary. The court of appeals, however, reversed. Cortright v.
Resor, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972). In an
opinion that likewise recognized that a determination of the scope of discretion was
necessary, the court held that this scope had not been exceeded. The court
recognized that Army personnel had a right of protest, but that the Army likewise
had a right to maintain the effectiveness of its military units. The court of appeals
reversed because it felt that the Army had a "large scope" of discretion in striking
a balance between the conflicting rights and that the Army had not overstepped its
"bounds." Id. at 255.
A careful reading of these cases indicates that a strong argument can be
made that phrases such as action beyond a "rational exercise of discretion," acts
"beyond their discretion," and action "outside the scope" of discretionary authority,
are used synonymously with "an abuse of discretion." Although Byse and Fiocca,
supra note 1, at 335 n.99, recognize the "difficult subtle and controversial questions
that lie behind the expression 'scope of the delegated power' (or 'authority' or
'discretion')," id. at 335 n.99, they too have employed "abuse of discretion" where
"action beyond the scope of discretion" would seemingly be equally applicable.
Id. at 350. For example, courts which have defined "abuse of discretion" in the
context of mandamus have indicated that the writ will issue to correct "an abuse of
discretion," which is "not the exercise of discretion, but Action beyond the limits of
discretion." Palmer v. Fox, 118 Cal. App. 2d 453, 456, 258 P.2d 30, 33 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1953); accord, Browning v. Dow, 60 Cal. App. 680, 682, 213 P. 707, 708
(Dist. Ct. App. 1923). What is most significant, however, is that no matter what
term a particular court utilizes in its examination, courts utilizing the second ap-
proach examine the extent of permissible discretion, whereas courts utilizing the first
approach do not.
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side the Second Circuit.43
When faced with actions for mandamus under section 1361,
courts should employ the second approach-looking beyond a mere
determination of whether the duty owed is within the discretion of
the administrator and deciding whether the scope of discretion has
been exceeded. Professor Davis has argued that
43. A small number of cases outside the Second Circuit involving mandamus
under section 1361 have demonstrated a willingness to utilize the second approach.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Peoples v. USDA,
427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970), held that poor people in the State of Alabama
were entitled to maintain an action against the Department of Agriculture to raise
objections to the administration of the Food Stamp Act of 1964. The court inter-
preted section 1361 as permitting district courts generally to issue corrective orders
when federal officials are not acting "within the zone of their permissible discretion
but are abusing their discretion . . . ," id. at 565, and remanded the case to the
district court to rule on the "nature and scope" of the Secretary of Agriculture's
discretion. Id. at 566. The district court was further instructed that even if it
should conclude that the matter involved was committed to the discretion of the
Secretary, the district .court should also express its views as to whether the Secretary's
exercise of discretion was consistent with the pertinent statute and the Constitution
in the event the exercise of discretion is held subject to judicial review. Id. The
Peoples court thus indicated that an examination of the scope of discretion of the
administrator was necessary; in a supplemental opinion, however, the court of
appeals backed off considerably. In response to the defendant's contention that if
it were determined that Congress had committed the administration of the Food
Stamp Program to the Secretary, a ruling as to whether he exercised proper discre-
tion would be unnecessary, the court issued a supplemental opinion and held that
the district court's view on the claim of abuse of discretion was "not . . . impera-
tive." Id. at 567. Although clouded by the supplemental opinion, Peoples can
fairly be read to support the position that a court must not merely determine
whether an action is ministerial or discretionary, but should also determine, if the
act sought to be compelled or retracted is discretionary, the permissible scope of
discretion. By using the language "where Federal officials are not acting within
the zone of their permissible discretion but are abusing their discretion or otherwise
acting contrary to law . . ." id. at 565, the Peoples court also gave weight to the
argument that action outside the "zone of permissible discretion," at least in the
context of an action for mandamus, may be synonymous with an "abuse of discre-
tion." See note 42 supra.
A Third Circuit case, Davis v. Shultz, 453 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1971), indicated
a similar willingness to examine the scope of discretion of an administrator (the
Secretary of Labor), and it affirmed the dismissal of an action brought by a dis-
charged Neighborhood Youth Corps trainee. The court stated that the "plaintiff
has claimed no such variance from the permissible scope of discretion granted
to [the] Secretary . . . ." Id. at 502. The court also indicated, without citation,
that "tt]he majority view is that in certain limited cases a § 1361 action may be
used to compel the performance of an act committed to discretion." Id.
A recent Fourth Circuit decision, Burnett v. Tolson, No. 72-1545 (4th Cir.,
Feb. 21, 1973), stated in dictum that determining a particular duty to be discre-
tionary "does not necessarily resolve the question of the availability of mandamus."
Id. at 9 n.8. Terming the ministerial-discretionary dichotomy as "not very helpful
in analysis," id. at 12, the court seemed to be rejecting the first approach.
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[t]he law resting upon the ministerial discretionary distinction is
. . . undesirable in that it prevents the use of judicial skills on the
very questions of interpretation on which those skills are most
needed .... 44
When a mandamus action under section 1361 is brought, a court
necessarily must resolve whether the action in question is ministerial
or discretionary. The distinction itself is often not clearly defined,
for, while almost all administrative actions involve some elements of
discretion, few are entirely discretionary;4* a court which has adopted
the first approach, purporting to grant relief only when the duty is
ministerial, would seem to be restricting mandamus to those situations
where the duty is only slightly or insubstantially discretionary. Since
this ministerial-discretionary determination must be made in all cases,
it would require little additional effort to delineate-once the act
sought to be compelled or retracted is found discretionary in nature-
the permissible scope of discretion, and to determine whether that
scope has been exceeded.
A judicial determination of the permissible scope of discretion
would be beneficial in several respects. First, this determination
would set out the parameters of the scope of action and would there-
by establish guidelines for future conduct. Second, if the permissible
scope has been exceeded, a remedy can be afforded an injured litigant
who might otherwise be denied one. Also, in most cases, petitioners
do not allege that the defendant official was granted no discretion,
but rather that the withholding of the relief sought by the petitioner
is an improper use of the discretion granted; courts utilizing the first
approach never reach this question.40  The proper question for
44. 3 DAVIs § 23.11, at 354 (1958). Professor Jaffe has commented: "Mhe
notion that each administrative act can be classified a priori either as 'ministerial'
or 'discretionary' is unsound and unworkable." JAFFE 181. Byse and Fiocca have
stated that "[perhaps the most effective step in the development of a rational
law of mandamus would be judicial rejection or abandonment of the ministerial.
discretionary distinction . . . . " Byse & Fiocca, supra note 1, at 334.
45. "As a mode of analysis, the ministerial-discretionary dichotomy is largely
illusory because there are few federal administrative determinations that do not
involve an element of discretion and few that are wholly discretionary." Byse &
Fiocca, supra note 1, at 333. Professor Jaffe is in agreement: "The classification
is illusory ....
* * ' Most powers to act involve some elements of choice if only as to detail.
On the other hand, nearly all powers to act, however numerous and broad the
considerations relevant to choice, exclude and deny the legality of other elements
as factors of choice." JAFFE 181.
46. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 1, at 334.
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the court to decide in its determination of whether to grant relief to
the aggrieved party, therefore, is not whether the duty owed is dis-
cretionary, but whether the refusal to act is within the permissible
realm of the discretion granted to the administrator.47
47. Professor Davis contends that in general "the greatest and most frequent
injustice occurs at the discretion end of the scale . . ." K. DAvis, DiscmnoNARY
JUSTICE v. (1969).
